In this paper, we develop a novel model to forecast the volatility of S&P 500 futures returns by considering measures of limits to arbitrage. When arbitrageurs face constraints on their trading strategies, option prices can become disconnected from fundamentals, resulting in a distortion that reflects the limits to arbitrage. The corresponding market based implied volatility will therefore also contain these distortions. We argue that limits to arbitrage can be systematic or idiosyncratic and we search for proxies to capture these effects. Our contributions are both conceptual and empirical. Conceptually, the distinction between systematic and idiosyncratic effects of limits to arbitrage can shed light on relative asset prices as exemplified by this particular study. Empirically, our volatility forecasting model explains 71% of the variation in realized volatility, a substantial improvement over a naive forecast based only on lagged realized volatility, which produces an R
Introduction
Forecasting volatility is an essential task for many financial market participants.
The level and evolution of volatility directly impact hedge funds that specialize in volatility trading strategies, financial services firms that provide insurance against volatility, regulators who seek to stabilize markets, and risk managers who measure and manage a portfolio's value-at-risk (VAR). To the extent that realized and anticipated volatility affect current and future asset prices, anyone who manages money can benefit from a better forecast of volatility.
Volatility is an essential parameter used to price option contracts. Alternatively, given a set of options with known strike prices and expiration dates, and given the riskfree rate of interest, the observed market prices of options can be used to back out an estimate of the volatility expected to prevail over the life of the option, i.e., the implied volatility. Assuming frictionless markets, and assuming the underlying stock price process is characterized by geometric Brownian motion, the implied volatility is an unbiased and efficient estimate of the mean volatility that will prevail over the life of the option because potential arbitrageurs face no impediments to capitalizing on any arbitrage opportunities that arise and, as a result, prices will remain aligned with fundamentals.
However, in the presence of transaction costs, financing constraints, and other limits to arbitrage, option prices can become distorted, since potential arbitrageurs will modify their activities due to uncertainty regarding capital availability and transaction costs. When option prices are distorted the implied volatility obtained from said option 4 turn begets an increase in implied volatility. Clearly, asset prices, liquidity and limits to arbitrage are very much inter-connected. Hu, Pan, and Wang (2013) , hereafter HPW, propose a measure of illiquidity based on price differences of U.S. Treasury securities. When there is ample arbitrage capital available, all Treasury securities are anchored to the zero-coupon yield curve. However, when arbitrage capital is in short supply, very liquid on-the-run Treasury securities trade at a premium relative to their off-the-run breathren, creating noise in actual treasury prices relative to a fitted zero coupon yield curve. HPW average these Treasury security 5 price differences across a wide range of maturities to produce a measure of illiquidity that they dub "noise". In so far as the U.S. Treasury market is the world's most liquid market and a market whose securities most closely approximate risk-free securities, the price disparities between on-the-run and off-the-run Treasury securities reflect the availability of funding capital because arbitrageurs are not making the obvious set of convergence trades required to correct the relative mispricing. For this reason HPW argue that their noise measure is a good proxy for funding liquidity.
Similar enforcement mechanisms exist in other markets. For instance, when a closed-end fund (CEF) trades at a discount or premium to its net asset value (NAV), arbitrageurs should step in to force a convergence in prices. That they do not suggests that there are limits to arbitrage. However, unlike the case of on-the-run/off-the-run treasury arbitrage, not only are arbitrageurs exposed to the risk that outside capital will flee, but there remain significant, unhedgeable risks (e.g., basis risk) due to the fact that CEF portfolios are observable only at a quarterly frequency with a 45-day delay.
Moreover, trading costs (e.g., taking short positions in CEF shares or their portfolio holdings) can be prohibitive and time-varying, especially for CEFs that invest in illiquid assets, or whose shares themselves are illiquid (see Nohel, Todd, and Wang, 2013) . Pontiff (1996) shows that CEF deviations from NAV are an increasing function of arbitrage costs. In the presence of high funding or transaction costs (or other frictions), arbitrageurs will require larger rewards for their activities, resulting in ever larger deviations from fundamental value. We argue that in stressed markets, characterized by high volatility, the costs of arbitrage increase and we should expect larger deviations from fundamental value.
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We stipulate two distinct types of frictions affecting arbitrageurs: systematic frictions that limit arbitrageurs' activities across most/all markets, and idiosyncratic frictions whose effects are confined to one or at most a few assets. For ease of exposition we abuse the language and refer to these as systematic and idiosyncratic limits to arbitrage, respectively.
Since most/all arbitrageurs rely on outside funding, funding liquidity is clearly an example of a systematic limit to arbitrage. We use HPW's measure of noise in treasury prices to proxy for this effect. Though HPW describe this as a liquidity measure, we prefer to think of it as a measure of limits to arbitrage. Under the category "idiosyncratic limits to arbitrage" we would include such items as margin requirements, which are typically asset specific, basis risks based on portfolio uncertainty, event risks, such as the possibility of short sale restrictions and other unhedgeable risks such as an exposure to higher moments of risk due to market incompleteness.
One might think that S&P 500 futures options traders need not worry about idiosyncratic liquidity because the S&P 500 is a diversified basket and there is no basis risk between S&P 500 futures options and S&P 500 futures (the underlying asset).
However, the largest arbitrageurs (e.g., hedge funds and money-center banks) operate in several asset classes/markets, and an idiosyncratic shock in one market can quickly reverberate into other markets. Hence, both systematic and idiosyncratic limits to arbitrage are likely to converge during a financial crisis. 4 Moreover, arbitrage trades that 7 aren't unwound intra-day are exposed to higher moments of risk, related to stochastic volatility. Finally, for arbitrageurs undertaking index arbitrage in tandem with futures options trades, there are risks associated with changes in the composition of the S&P 500 index itself, of which there were several hundred during our sample period of 1997-2008.
Our conjecture is that when the supply of arbitrage capital is not aligned with enduser demand for futures options, the result is distorted futures option prices (and commensurately distorted option implied volatilities) and an inefficient forecast of future realized volatility. We construct an index that measures the aggregate mispricing among equity closed-end funds. Whereas we use the noise measure of HPW to proxy for systematic limits to arbitrage, we argue that our CEF measure reflects idiosyncratic limits to arbitrage, such as event risks, basis risks, and other unhedgeable risks, in addition to systematic limits to arbitrage.
We construct a dataset of S&P 500 futures and futures options spanning the period 1997 -2008 to test our volatility forecasting model. We use futures prices in 5-minute intervals to construct a realized volatility series. We sample end-of-day futures option prices each month, focusing on the next-to-expire contracts (with just under four weeks until expiration, to minimize microstructure effects). We construct an index measuring the absolute deviations of domestic equity CEFs from their NAVs. We use absolute deviations instead of discounts because CEFs that trade at premiums are similarly mispriced, and we don't want the negative "discounts" on premium funds to net out the discounts on discounted CEFs. We estimate a series of regressions exploring the relation between these variables in forecasting future realized volatility.
desperate to raise capital. We might expect a similar effect in the market for S&P 500 futures, the asset underlying any convergence trade involving options on the S&P 500 futures.
We find that lagged values of implied volatility (either Black-Scholes or modelfree measures) are statistically significant in forecasts of future realized volatility. We find that lagged measures of HPW's noise index, as well as our closed-end fund absolute mispricing index, are also statistically significant in forecasts of future volatility. A 1% increase in the HPW noise index (reflecting worsening funding liquidity) predicts a 3.51% increase in realized volatility, and a 1% increase in the closed-end fund absolute mispricing index forecasts a 4.14% increase in realized volatility.
Furthermore, we find that the information in implied volatility subsumes the information in the HPW noise index, but not the volatility-relevant information in the closed-end fund mispricing index. Using the closed-end fund mispricing index and its lag, along with lagged measures of implied volatility, we are able to explain about 71% of the total variation in realized volatility, significantly better than a naive forecast based only on lagged realized volatility, which produces an R 2 of 53%. Our findings suggest that the closed-end fund mispricing index contains additional volatility-relevant information beyond that captured by lagged values of implied and realized volatilities, but the HPW noise index does not.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize the relevant literature on volatility forecasting and limits to arbitrage and motivate the variable choices for our volatility forecasting model. In Section 3 we describe our methodology, especially our estimation procedure for model-free implied volatilities. We present our empirical results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 9
Related Literature

Volatility Forecasting Models
Volatility forecasting is the subject of a plethora of academic papers and research reports by practitioners. 5 These papers tend to fall into two general categories: ARCH and GARCH-type models based on past time-series behavior of the realized volatility process, and market variable-based models that use contemporaneous market-determined variables (e.g., option implied volatility) as forward-looking measures of investor expectations. 6 The former attempt to describe a stochastic process that is consistent with past observations on realized volatility, focusing on time-series econometrics rather than the economic fundamentals that underlie observed volatility series, while the latter exploit the fact that expectations of future volatility are a crucial input into option pricing models and are naturally forward-looking. It is generally accepted that forecasts based on measures of implied volatility are superior to ARCH/GARCH-type forecasts, though there is little consensus on how best to compute the implied volatility.
Implied volatilities based on Black-Scholes (1973) Andersen et al. (2003) , and Anderson, Bollerslev, and Meddahi (2005) show the superiority of using high-frequency data to compute realized volatility, concluding that 5-minute pricing provides a much better estimate of realized volatility than daily pricing. Britten-Jones and Neuberger (2000) derive a model-free implied volatility (MFIV) and Jiang and Tian (2005a, b) show that MFIV remains valid in the presence of jumps. They also describe how MFIV can be estimated consistently. We follow Martens (2002) , Andersen et al. (2003) , and Anderson, Bollerslev, and Meddahi (2005) and compute realized volatilities using 5-minute pricing, and we implement the MFIV algorithm of Jiang and Tian (2005a) The Britten-Jones and Neuberger (2000) formula for MFIV takes the form of an integral (sum) of expected square returns over a range of strike prices. Of critical importance is that this expectation is evaluated using risk-neutral probabilities, rather than objective probabilities. If volatility is stochastic and there is a risk premium associated with volatility risk, then the risk-neutral and objective expectations of future squared returns will differ significantly, leading to errors in forecasts of future realized volatility based on MFIV.
Limits to Arbitrage
If arbitrageurs face frictions that inhibit their trading activities, option prices will adjust to reflect these constraints, thereby affecting the risk neutral probability measure and as a consequence, the implied volatility. We argue that such limits to arbitrage can be categorized into two types: frictions best categorized as systematic, such as funding liquidity, because they affect all arbitrageurs, and frictions that are better categorized as idiosyncratic because they are specific to a particular asset or at most a few assets (such as changes in margin requirements, or restrictions on shorting, costs related to basis risk, uncertainty about portfolio holdings, or unhedgeable risks such as higher moments of risk due to market incompleteness).
In the presence of such frictions, and given that the nature of the frictions is timevarying, arbitrageurs will demand a greater reward in the form of a larger price disparity as compensation for bearing the additional costs/risks. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue 13 that it is precisely when deviations from fundamental value are greatest that arbitrageurs become extremely reluctant to execute or maintain arbitrage trades, due to their relatively shallow pockets and short time horizons.
Increased uncertainty or concerns about a jump in volatility increase the costs of arbitrage. Arbitrageurs need to make trades, so their ability to enter and exit trades is paramount. Deuskar (2006) shows that volatility, expected volatility, and market illiquidity are very much interrelated and self-reinforcing: liquidity often dries up when investors expect volatility to increase. Confronted with a mispriced asset that is moving in the wrong direction, an arbitrageur may be forced to liquidate his positions at the worst possible time, a risk Shleifer and Vishny (1997) label as performance-based arbitrage.
We recognize that limits to arbitrage affect security prices, allowing deviations from fundamental value to persist. We search for proxies that capture the systematic and idiosyncratic frictions that arbitrageurs face. We believe that by incorporating these variables in our model of volatility forecasting, we can improve upon previous models used to forecast future realized volatility.
Funding Liquidity
HPW argue that the abundance of arbitrage capital during normal times helps smooth out the Treasury yield curve and keep the average yield dispersion low. When yields fall out of line, hedge funds and proprietary traders at investment banks step in to execute relative value and arbitrage trades across various habitats of the Treasury yield 14 curve. The simplicity and transparency of these trades make them very appealing and relatively easy to execute.
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During liquidity crises, however, the lack of arbitrage capital forces traders to limit or even abandon their relative value trades, allowing yields to move more freely and resulting in more yield curve noise. HPW argue that this abnormal noise in Treasury yields is a symptom of a market in severe shortage of arbitrage capital. Moreover, if active traders allocate capital across various asset classes, a shortage of arbitrage capital in the Treasury market can quickly spread to other markets. For this reason, we argue that the HPW noise measure proxies for frictions that by nature are systematic. We abuse the language and refer to "systematic limits to arbitrage".
Closed-End Funds and Idiosyncratic Limits to Arbitrage
While open-end mutual funds are required to redeem or issue new shares at the reported net asset value (NAV) at the end of each trading day, closed-end funds (CEFs) face no such redemption requirements. Instead, closed-end fund shares trade on equity markets just like stock. 10 Therefore, for closed-end funds we observe both an NAV and a price, and these two quantities are usually different.
For the vast majority of closed-end funds, the share price is typically well below the NAV, resulting in the so-called closed-end fund discount. Many academics view the closed-end fund discount as compelling evidence of investor irrationality, where retail 9 The arbitrage strategy is to buy Treasuries which yield more than their analog zero coupon yields and sell Treasuries which yield less than their zero coupon counterparts. 10 Compared to open-end funds, closed-end funds also make greater use of leverage.
investors (noise traders) drive prices away from fundamental value (NAV). 11 However, numerous rational explanations for the closed-end fund discount exist, including liquidity differences between CEF holdings and CEF shares, CEF distribution policies, CEF portfolio manager skills and compensation, unrealized capital gains, and agency problems. 12 In this paper, we ignore the root causes of discounts (or premiums) and
instead focus on what impediments might arise to limit CEF arbitrage trades. Moreover, we do not require that price equals NAV in equilibrium.
Quite a few hedge funds and mutual funds are engaged in CEF arbitrage. There are also activist hedge funds that target CEFs trading at discounts, hoping to take control and either liquidate the fund's assets or open-end the fund. These traders represent a powerful force against CEF mispricing. However, as Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Pontiff (1996) argue, CEF arbitrage does not conform to the academic ideal of costless, riskless arbitrage that requires no capital. These papers argue that costs inhibit CEF arbitrage and deviations from fundamental value are an increasing function of these costs.
Trading costs are not negligible, especially for short positions in the CEF shares or the CEF assets, which are often illiquid. Second, basis risk can be quite substantial because CEF holdings are observed with a lag and only once per quarter (at most). Third, an increase in volatility will exacerbate the mismatch between an arbitrageur's portfolio and the CEF. Finally, the nature of these frictions is time-varying.
11 Examples of these sentiment-based explanations of the CEF discount include De Long et al. (1990) , Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) , and Shleifer and Vishny (1997 We stipulate that mispricing in the CEF market provides a window into the idiosyncratic frictions that arbitrageurs face. We construct an index that measures the absolute deviation of closed-end fund prices from NAV for a subset of domestic, equitybased closed end funds. We argue that as limits to arbitrage become more severe, CEF prices will likely deviate further from NAV. This measure will reflect both systematic and idiosyncratic limits to arbitrage, while the illiquidity measure of HPW reflects primarily the effects of systematic limits to arbitrage.
Data and Methodology
Systematic Risks for Arbitrageurs: Funding Liquidity
Our proxy for systematic limits to arbitrage is the noise measure of HPW. 13 To calculate their measure, HPW first estimate a smooth zero-coupon yield curve using daily Treasury security price data. Each Treasury security is then benchmarked to a similarmaturity zero coupon yield. The HPW index squares and aggregates these yield differentials, with large values indicative of greater dispersion from the zero coupon yield curve.
Idiosyncratic Risks for Arbitrageurs: Closed-end Fund Mispricing
Using closed-end fund data from Morningstar, we construct our CEF mispricing index as follows. The mispricing on a closed-end fund equals the absolute value of the difference between the closed-end fund price and its net asset value, expressed as a percentage of the net asset value.
CEF Mispricing = |Price -NAV| / NAV
On each trading day we compute the CEF mispricing measure for each domestic equity closed-end fund. Our mispricing index is set equal to the arithmetic average of the CEF mispricing measure for all domestic equity funds (an equally-weighted index) or a weighted average of the CEF mispricing measure for all domestic equity funds. Here a fund's weight equals the product of the fund's NAV and its shares outstanding at the end of the previous month (a value-weighted index).
14 We conjecture that the CEF mispricing index reflects the effects of idiosyncratic limits to arbitrage, in addition to the effects of systematic limits to arbitrage.
Realized Volatilities
We follow Martens (2002) , Andersen et al. (2003) , and Anderson, Bollerslev, and Meddahi (2005) in calculating realized volatility based on returns over 5 minute intervals (an intra-day measure). 
Black-Scholes Implied Volatilities
We collect intraday data on S&P 500 futures contracts traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) during the period 1997 -2008. We also collect daily closing prices on S&P 500 futures options (also traded at the CME). We measure implied volatility two different ways: the Black-Scholes implied volatility (BSIV) using Whaley's (1986) adjustment for futures; and the model-free implied volatility (MFIV) based on Britten-Jones and Neuberger (2000), and Jiang and Tian (2005a, b) .
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Estimation of Model-Free Implied Volatilities
We compute model-free implied volatilities based on Proposition 1 in Jiang and Tian (2005a) which states that the integrated variance (square of volatility) from time 0 to time T is specified by the set of all call options expiring at T through the following integral:
where K represents the strike price and F t represents the forward probability measure.
This expression comes from Britten-Jones and Neuberger (2000) and Jiang and Tian (2005a) derive this expression under more general assumptions (when asset prices contain jumps). Notice that the numerator of the integrand represents the time value of a call option (call price minus intrinsic value). The integral is taken over a continuum of strikes between 0 and infinity.
The problem with trying to estimate (3) using traded options is that there are only a limited number of contracts being traded at any given time that expire at time T. Thus, in general, one needs to solve something akin to (4) below: Equation (3) needs to be solved numerically. The first step is to deal with the fact that there do not exist call options with a continuum of strikes expiring at T. Once this problem has been dealt with, we focus on the issue of truncation error that stems from the fact that there do not exist options with strikes that surpass K Max, nor options with strikes less than K Min . The first problem is one of interpolation, the second, one of extrapolation.
We consider extrapolated as well as truncated (i.e., un-extrapolated) solutions.
Interpolation Using Cubic Splines
To solve the problem of lack of a continuum of strikes, we again follow Jiang and Tian (2005a) and use cubic splines. We create a smooth curve that is fitted exactly, based on observed prices, and interpolate using cubic polynomials for values between these observed prices. Jiang and Tian (2005a) argue that given that option values are highly 20 non-linear functions of strike prices, there is precedent in the literature (see Ait-Sahalia and Lo, 1998) to use a curve-fitting algorithm to form a volatility surface and transform it into a price surface, rather than forming a price surface directly.
Each observed price is turned into an implied volatility using the Black-Scholes model. Cubic splines are then applied to form a volatility surface. Then any point on that volatility surface can be converted back to a price using the Black-Scholes model. In this way one can create as fine a grid of option prices as is desired (we use grid increments of one index point, which is more than sufficient to insure accuracy). Note that the Black-Scholes model is only being used as a means to transform prices into volatilities and then back into prices. As such it does not impose an assumption that option prices behave as in the Black-Scholes model.
The spline is a curve-fitting algorithm that imposes some smoothness conditions that enable a researcher to fit a 3 rd degree polynomial to a given set of data, along with conditions on the first and second derivatives of the spline to ensure smoothness. Take adjoining intervals at time t and t+1. Since each consecutive interval shares a common point with its predecessor, smoothness necessitates that the spline function itself, its first derivative, and its second derivative from interval t, evaluated at interval t's right endpoint, must equal the comparable terms for the spline in interval t+1, evaluated at its left endpoint to ensure smoothness. Imposing these smoothness conditions solves for the coefficients on the splines in each interval.
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Extrapolation Beyond Traded Strikes
In order to extrapolate to strikes that lie outside the range of options traded at any point in time, we again follow Jiang and Tian (2005a) and use the following algorithm.
We measure the implied volatility for the option with the lowest strike. We then assume that all lower strikes have the same implied volatility as the traded option with the lowest strike and use the Black-Scholes model to estimate call prices for those strikes that fall below the traded range. An analogous procedure can be applied to strikes beyond the highest traded strike.
Numerical Integration Procedure
Armed with a complete set of call prices (for as wide a range of strikes as is deemed necessary), we can go about estimating the integral in (4), which is an approximation to the integral depicted in (3). We use the Trapezoidal Rule to evaluate the integral in (4) numerically, which is straightforward. The "range" of the integral (from the bottom endpoint to the top endpoint) is divided into intervals of 1 index point.
For any interval, say between X 0 and X 0 + α, linearly interpolate between f(X 0 ) and f(X 0 + α). The four points, (X 0 , 0), (X 0 + α, 0), (X 0 + α, f(X 0 + α)), and (X 0 , f(X 0 )) form a trapezoid whose area is given by:
. By summing the areas of these trapezoids we get an estimate of the integral. As long as the integrand is fairly smooth and the grid is fine enough then we can make this as accurate as necessary.
Following Jiang and Tian (2005a) , we ignore all in-the-money calls, defined as options with strike prices less than 97% of the futures price, (i.e., cases where the given option is more than 3% in the money), and instead focus on out-of-the-money put options
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(and out-of-the-money call options) to derive our volatility surface. It is well established that in-the-money options are not very liquid and therefore pose considerable hurdles.
The out-of-the-money options are far more liquid.
Dataset Construction
We construct our non-telescoping dataset in the following way: we sample option prices at one-month intervals, strategically choosing the interval so as to minimize microstructure effects while preserving consistency of the interval length. We select the Finally, as it turns out, all the series we consider in our volatility forecasting model have a fair amount of serial correlation, particularly our limits to arbitrage proxies.
Thus, inclusion of lags and an examination of first differences are critical steps in our analysis to insure that our regressions are well-specified. We also consider additional lags, but all series appear to be AR(1).
Armed with our measures of systematic and non-systematic risks faced by arbitrageurs, we estimate the following equation. and/or b 4 should be significant and our R 2 values should increase.
Regression Estimates
We present summary statistics for our data in these values in terms of deviations from the mean, we obtain a range of μ -0.92σ to μ + 5.79σ, similar to the realized volatility series which travels between μ -1.13σ to μ + 5.43σ. In contrast, our CEF mispricing indices travel a narrower range (e.g., μ -1.79σ to μ + 2.66σ, in the case of our value-weighted index and a similar range for the equallyweighted index). In Tables 3 -5 , we examine various specifications of a volatility forecasting model that uses the implied volatilities from option prices, as well as proxies for systematic and idiosyncratic limits to arbitrage, to predict future realized volatility. Our basic model is described in equation (6) below:
Here, RVOL t is the realized volatility of S&P 500 futures returns over the period [t-1, t], based on price data sampled at 5-minute intervals. IMPVOL t -1 is the implied volatility of the S&P 500 futures returns, based on daily closing prices for S&P 500 futures options, expiring at time t, and sampled at time t-1 (see Section 3). We compute implied volatility two different ways: the Black-Scholes implied volatility (BSIV) using Whaley's (1986) adjustment for futures; and the model-free implied volatility (MFIV) based on Britten-Jones and Neuberger (2000), and Jiang and Tian (2005a, b) . NOISE t-1 is a lagged measure of HPW's noise index reflecting the availability of arbitrage capital, and CEFMIS t-1 is a lagged measure of closed-end fund absolute deviations from net asset value (NAV), either value-weighted (VWCEFMISP) or equally-weighted (EWCEFMISP), averaged across the universe of US domestic equity closed-end funds.
In our tests of equation (6), we use non-overlapping monthly data for the period 1997 -2008. We have 144 observations in total. Table 3 reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics for specifications of equation (6) Table 3 confirms that our proxies for limits to arbitrage, NOISE and CEFMIS, are in fact each capturing different aspects of the limits to arbitrage.
In Panel B, Models 9 -14 test whether our limits to arbitrage proxies have explanatory power beyond the information contained in lagged measures of implied volatility and realized volatility. Not surprisingly, since our measure of the availability of arbitrage capital (NOISE) was already shown to be redundant in the presence of lagged historical volatility, the coefficients on lagged NOISE and its lag are insignificant in models 9 -12. However, our closed-end fund mispricing index retains its predictive power. In Models 13 and 14, which combine lagged measures of implied volatility, realized volatility and closed-end fund mispricing, we are able to explain about 71% of the variation in realized volatility, significantly better than a naive forecast based on lagged realized volatility alone (Model 1 in Panel A), which produces an R 2 of 53%. Table 4 reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics for specifications of equation (6) based on the Black-Scholes implied volatility (BSIV). As in Table 3 , we see that BSIV does a good job forecasting future realized volatility (Model 1), with an adjusted R 2 of 64%. However, the residuals are serially correlated, casting doubt on our t-stat and R 2 measures. Adding additional regressors leads to well-behaved error terms and higher explanatory power. As we saw in Table 3 , the closed-end fund mispricing index retains its explanatory power in the presence of the other regressors, while NOISE is subsumed by lagged historical volatility. Using all regressors, including the closed-end fund mispricing index (Model 8), we are able to explain about 71% of the variation in realized volatility, significantly better than a naive forecast based on lagged realized volatility only (Model A), which produces an R 2 of 53%. Comparing Table 4 to Table 3 , we see that the ability of BSIV to forecast realized volatility is comparable to that of MSIV.
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In an effort to induce symmetry in our time-series data, we alter equation (6) by taking logarithmic transformations of the dependent and independent variables. Our results, presented in Table 5 , are qualitatively similar, with the adjusted R 2 values slightly higher.
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We also examine first-differences of our time-series data in Table 6 . We estimate the following model:
Here ΔRVOL t is defined as RVOL t -RVOL t-1 , and ΔMFIV t-1 is defined as MFIV t-1 -MFIV t-2 ; other variables are similarly defined. We report univariate results in Models 1 -3. Here we see that changes in implied volatility and changes in the closed-end fund mispricing index forecast changes in realized volatility, with 12% to 14% of the variation 28 in realized volatility changes explained. In contrast, innovations in HPW's noise index have no predictive power.
In Model 4, we see that innovations in the noise index work in tandem with implied volatility innovations to explain a combined 20% of the variation in realized volatility innovations. Similarly, innovations in the closed-end fund mispricing index also work in tandem with implied volatility innovations to explain about 20% of the variation in changes in realized volatility. Finally, Model 7 shows that all three innovation variables (implied volatility, noise, and closed-end fund mispricing) are significant in explaining innovations in realized volatility; here the adjusted R 2 rises to 27%.
We perform several tests to assess the marginal contributions of some of our independent variables when it comes to forecasting realized volatility. This is particularly important for our measures reflecting systematic and idiosyncratic limits to arbitrage. We start by orthogonalizing the noise index with respect to implied volatility and using the residuals from this initial regression in place of the noise index in a second model that predicts realized volatility. Our approach is described in Equation (8). 
We then repeat this procedure, but in the first step we orthogonalize implied volatility with respect to the noise index. With either approach, we test whether the residuals (and lagged residuals) from the first step have explanatory power in the second regression.
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Our results appear in Table 7 . Panel A reports the results of orthogonalizing the noise index on implied volatility; Panel B reports the results of orthogonalizing implied volatility on the noise index.
In Panel A, the residuals have no explanatory power, whereas our measures of implied volatility and lagged realized volatility are statistically significant. These results comport with Model 10 from Table 3 .
In contrast, the residuals (and the lagged residuals) are statistically significant at the 1% level in Panel B, as is the lagged noise index of HPW. We can reasonably conclude that MFIV contains additional volatility-relevant information beyond that which is captured by funding constraints, but the noise index of HPW contains no volatilityrelevant information beyond that already reflected in implied volatility and lagged realized volatility.
We repeat this analysis in Table 8 but this time we expand the list of regressors to include our closed-end fund mispricing index as well as its lag. As we saw in Model 14
from Table 3 , we see that the mispricing index has statistically significant power to forecast future realized volatility. Once again, we can reasonably conclude that MFIV contains additional volatility-relevant information beyond that which is captured by funding constraints, but the noise index of HPW contains no volatility-relevant information beyond that already reflected in implied volatility and lagged realized volatility. Moreover, our CEF mispricing index contains volatility-relevant information beyond that contained in either MFIV or the noise index of HPW. These relationships are depicted in Figure 1 , which shows that any volatility-relevant information in the noise index of HPW is subsumed by MFIV. Moreover, our CEF mispricing index and MVIF each contain volatility-relevant information that is unique, distinct from each other, and distinct from the information in the noise index.
Finally, in results not reported in tabular form, we also regress our closed-end fund mispricing index (VWCEFMISP) on the noise measure of HPW (NOISE). We test whether the residuals from this regression are statistically significant predictors of realized volatility. It turns out they are. When we reverse the procedure, regressing the noise measure (NOISE) on the closed-end fund mispricing index (VWCEFMISP), we find that the residuals from this regression are not statistically significant predictors of realized volatility. We conclude that VWCEFMISP contains additional volatilityrelevant information beyond that captured by funding constraints.
These results are robust to different measures of implied volatility, such as BSIV, as well as models using logarithmic transformations. Moreover, all results are qualitatively similar if we replace our value-weighted mispricing index with the equallyweighted mispricing index.
Conclusions
In this paper, we develop a model to forecast the volatility of S&P 500 futures returns. We examine several potential predictors, including realized volatility, implied volatility, as well as the noise measure of Hu, Pan, and Wang (2013) and a measure of closed-end fund mispricing, arguing that the last two variables capture the effects of frictions that impede the activities of arbitrageurs, across all markets or isolated in one or among a few markets. In an abuse of language, we dub these systematic and idiosyncratic limits to arbitrage, respectively.
We estimate realized volatilities based on S&P 500 futures prices sampled at 5-minute intervals and we use end-of-day S&P 500 futures options prices to compute model-free implied volatilities, based on Jiang and Tian (2005) . We use the noise measure of Hu, Pan, and Wang (2013) to proxy for systematic limits to arbitrage. We conjecture that there are additional limits to arbitrage that are better classified as idiosyncratic. We develop an index that measures the absolute price deviations of equity closed-end funds from their net asset values. We argue that this index reflects some of these additional limits to arbitrage, as well as reflecting the effects of systematic limits to arbitrage.
We find that lagged values of implied volatility are statistically significant in forecasts of future volatility, as are lagged measures of noise, and lagged measures of our closed-end fund absolute mispricing index. We show that our closed-end fund mispricing index contains volatility-relevant beyond that contained in either lagged implied volatility or lagged realized volatility, while the noise measure of Hu et al. (2013) does not. Using the closed-end fund mispricing index, along with lagged measures of implied volatility and realized volatility, we are able to explain about 71% of the total variation in realized volatility, significantly better than a naive forecast based only on lagged realized volatility, which produces an R 2 of 53%.
Table 1
Summary Statistics RVOL is the realized volatility over the remaining life of an option (corresponding to the relevant measure of implied volatility), computed using 5-minute intervals for prices, MFIV is the implied volatility computed using the Britten-Jones & Neuberger (2000) model-free implied volatility based on interpolation between traded strikes and extrapolation beyond the range of traded strikes, as in Jiang and Tian (2005a) , CEFMIS t is the average of the absolute value of the discount on equity closed-end funds at time t (either value-weighted or equally-weighted), computed as |(Price -NAV)/NAV|, and LIQ t is the noise measure of Hu et al (2012) based on mean deviations from the zero-coupon yield curve at time t. Δs represent changes in the relevant variable, which account for the reduction in N by 1. Min, Max, Std Dev, Mean, and N are the minimum value, the maximum value, the standard deviation of values from the mean, the mean, and the number of observations, respectively. Table 2 Correlations Panel A -Levels CEFMIS is our CEF absolute deviation index (Equally-weighted (EW) or Value-weighted (VW)), MFIV is our model-free volatility measure, BSIV is the CME's implied volatility measure based on Black-Scholes, NOISE is the Noise measure of Hu et al. (2013) , and RVOL is the realized volatility. P-values are in parentheses underneath each correlation. RVOL is forward-looking over the interval corresponding to the expiration date of the options. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Panel B -Changes
ΔCEFMIS is the change in our CEF absolute deviation index (Equally-weighted (EW) or Value-weighted (VW)), ΔMFIV is the change in our model-free volatility measure, ΔBSIV is the change in the CME's implied volatility measure based on Black-Scholes, ΔNOISE is the change in the Noise measure of Hu et al. (2013) , and ΔRVOL is change in the realized volatility. P-values are in parentheses underneath each correlation. RVOL is forward-looking over the interval corresponding to the expiration date of the options. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Table 4 Estimation of the following regression:
where RVOL is the realized volatility over the remaining life of an option (corresponding to the relevant measure of implied volatility), computing using 5-minute intervals for prices, BSIV is the implied volatility computed using the Whaley model for futures options (based on Black-Scholes), CEFMIS t is the valueweighted average of the absolute value of the discount on equity closed-end funds at time t, computed as |(Price -NAV)/NAV|, and NOISE t is the noise measure of Hu et al. (2013) where RVOL is the realized volatility over the remaining life of an option (corresponding to the relevant measure of implied volatility), computing using 5-minute intervals for prices, MFIV is the implied volatility computed using the Britten-Jones & Neuberger (2000) model-free implied volatility based on interpolation between traded strikes and extrapolation beyond the range of traded strikes CEFMIS t is the value-weighted average of the absolute value of the discount on equity closed-end funds at time t, computed as |(Price -NAV)/NAV|, and NOISE t is the noise measure of Hu et al. (2013) Table 6 Forecasting Volatility Changes
Estimation of the following regression: 
